China, Bangladesh and Yunus
The old man had seen such nights before—when the river carried whispers not of tides, but of history shifting beneath its currents. As he crouched on the muddy banks, fingers trailing the dark waters, he felt something new, something vast moving beyond the reach of his senses. Not the usual trade boats skimming across the surface, nor the silent fishermen casting their nets under the shroud of night. No, this was different. The river, like the fate of nations, was restless. It was as if somewhere, in the unseen depths, deals were being struck, alliances forged, and betrayals set into motion.
Bangladesh, born of the flames of war in 1971, stands at a crossroads, a nation navigating the shifting tectonics of global influence. Encased between the towering presence of India, the economic pull of China, the distant yet looming shadow of the United States, and the steady financial embrace of the Middle East, Bangladesh has become a pivot in South Asia’s geostrategic calculations. As Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus prepares for his landmark visit to China on March 26, 2025—a journey burdened with historical shifts and new diplomatic currents—Bangladesh’s trajectory demands an intricate examination.
The country’s relationship with India is both an anchor and a weight. Their intertwined histories, forged in the crucible of Bangladesh’s independence, have seen moments of solidarity and friction. India’s intervention in 1971, its provision of refuge to 10 million Bengalis, and its support for the nascent state established a bond that has lasted decades. Under Sheikh Hasina’s administration, trade between the two nations soared to $12.5 billion annually by 2023, supported by projects like the Maitree Power Plant and the Akhaura-Agartala rail link. But proximity breeds complexity. The 4,096-kilometre border—the fifth longest in the world—became a space of both cooperation and contention, with disputes over the Teesta River’s waters and cross-border migration straining relations.
When Hasina was ousted in 2024, following mass protests over governance and economic hardship, Bangladesh’s political landscape shifted overnight. The new interim government under Yunus, seen as less subservient to Indian interests, refused to extradite Hasina—now a fugitive in Delhi—further souring ties. India responded by tightening its visa regime, limiting access to the millions of Bangladeshis who sought medical treatment there annually. The silence of the Bangladeshi media on India spoke volumes, signaling a pivot towards alternative alliances.
If India was a partner now at arm’s length, the United States had long been an economic lifeline with a strategic detachment. Garment exports to the US, reaching $7.5 billion annually by 2024, formed the backbone of Bangladesh’s $37.5 billion textile industry. American aid, totaling $2.375 billion since 2017, sustained over 1.2 million Rohingya refugees, a crisis that had become both a humanitarian challenge and a geopolitical card. Yet, Washington’s attention was fickle, its engagement pragmatic rather than ideological. Under the returning Trump administration in 2025, foreign aid was slashed—except for Rohingya support—leaving Bangladesh scrambling for new economic partners. Dhaka’s pivot towards Europe and the Middle East underscored its resilience, but also its realization that America’s strategic retreat left the region open for China’s deeper embrace.
China, a force Bangladesh could neither ignore nor fully trust, had woven itself into the fabric of the country’s economy and infrastructure. Formal diplomatic ties, established in 1975, had since evolved into a formidable partnership. By 2025, trade between the two nations stood at $23.75 billion annually, though Bangladesh struggled with a glaring trade imbalance—exporting merely $1 billion despite its zero-tariff access to the Chinese market. The Belt and Road Initiative had injected $25 billion into Bangladesh’s infrastructure, birthing projects like the $1.5 billion Padma Bridge and the $1 billion modernization of Mongla Port.
As Yunus embarks on his visit to Beijing, eight memoranda of understanding (MoUs) stand ready for signing, targeting trade expansion, port upgrades, and water management—a critical concern as Bangladesh battles climate-induced flooding. Among Dhaka’s demands is a renegotiation of loan terms: lowering interest rates from 2–3% to 1%, waiving additional fees, and extending repayment from 20 to 30 years. Early signals suggest China’s willingness to comply, knowing well that its influence in Bangladesh is part of a larger game—one that keeps India wary and the United States watchful.
But reliance on China is a double-edged sword. The Teesta River project, proposed in 2023 as an alternative to stalled negotiations with India, threatens to escalate tensions between Dhaka and New Delhi. Moreover, China’s planned mega-dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet could disrupt water flows downstream, a potential catastrophe for Bangladesh’s already fragile river systems. Dhaka, while eager for Chinese investments, treads cautiously, wary of entanglements in Beijing’s broader strategic maneuvers.
Beyond the Asian giants, the Middle East stands as Bangladesh’s quiet yet crucial economic anchor. With over 2 million Bangladeshi workers in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, the region’s remittances total $15 billion annually, forming 15% of Bangladesh’s GDP. Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) meets 20% of Dhaka’s energy needs, reinforcing an economic lifeline that predates Bangladesh’s independence. Early diplomatic recognition from Gulf states and humanitarian assistance during crises like the 1974 famine have solidified ties, yet the relationship remains largely transactional.
Looking ahead, the Middle East offers more than economic sustenance—it presents a strategic counterbalance. As US aid dwindles and China’s grip tightens, Gulf states could finance major infrastructure projects or even lead a “Marshall Plan” for the Rohingya crisis, a vision subtly hinted at in Bangladesh’s diplomatic circles. Security cooperation, especially in countering extremism in the Bay of Bengal, could also deepen, given the UAE’s expanding naval interests and Saudi Arabia’s regional ambitions.
As Bangladesh strides into 2035, three key variables will define its geostrategic posture. First, the ability of the interim government—or its successors—to negotiate favorable terms with China will shape its economic stability. If Bangladesh can boost exports to China to $2.5 billion annually, it could significantly reduce its trade deficit. Second, the evolving India-Bangladesh dynamic, currently at a nadir, could either trigger regional hostilities or spark renewed cooperation, potentially revitalizing SAARC. Third, global challenges—ranging from climate change to the Rohingya crisis—will necessitate coalitions that bridge China’s technical expertise, Middle Eastern financial power, and whatever remains of US humanitarian influence.
As the old man watched, the river shifted again, its ripples forming unfamiliar patterns. He felt it in his bones—something unseen was unfolding. Bangladesh, like the restless water, stood poised between tides—one leading towards prosperity, the other towards the unknown. The choice, as always, lay in the hands of those who dared to listen to the river’s song.
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Rajeev Ahmed
The Editor of Geopolits.com and the Author of the book titled Bengal Nexus
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