Skip to content
Geopolits
Menu
  • MAKING SENSE OF THE STRATEGIC WORLD
Menu
Water-sharing

Water-Sharing Disputes Between Bangladesh and India

April 27, 2025April 27, 2025

On Water-Sharing Dispute

Bangladesh, a country downstream of India and sharing 54 rivers with it, has long struggled with water-sharing problems that put its environment, food supply, and economy at serious risk. Two rivers—the Ganges and the Teesta—have been at the heart of the tension, affecting both relations with India and the lives of millions of Bangladeshis.

The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, signed in 1996 and set to expire in 2026, and the still-unresolved Teesta agreement highlight just how dependent Bangladesh is on India’s control of upstream water. Making matters worse, India’s recent decision to suspend its Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan (after a “terror attack” in Kashmir’s Pahalgam in April 2025) has deepened Dhaka’s fears that its own water deals could also be at risk.

The History Behind the Tensions

The disputes over the Ganges and Teesta Rivers go back decades, driven by both geography and politics. The Ganges (called the Padma in Bangladesh) supports farming, fishing, and transport across a huge part of the country. Trouble began in the 1970s when India built the Farakka Barrage to push more Ganges water toward the Hooghly River to help its ports. Bangladesh immediately suffered: river flows dropped, droughts got worse, saltwater crept further inland into the Sundarbans, and ecosystems started breaking down.

After years of back-and-forth talks, the two countries signed the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, promising Bangladesh at least 35,000 cubic feet per second during the dry season. But in reality, studies show that 65% of the time, Bangladesh gets less than promised, worsening water shortages.

The Teesta River tells a similar story. It starts in India’s Sikkim, flows through West Bengal, and then into Bangladesh. It’s crucial for irrigation—helping grow crops across 14% of Bangladesh’s farmland, mostly in the northern Rangpur region. A deal drafted in 2011 suggested giving Bangladesh 37.5% of the river’s dry-season flow. But West Bengal’s Chief Minister, Mamata Banerjee, blocked it, arguing that her state’s farmers also depend heavily on the Teesta. This shows how India’s internal politics make these river talks even more difficult.

For Bangladesh, these aren’t just political arguments—they’re life-and-death issues for millions of people.

Today’s Struggles: Fighting for Fairness

As 2026 gets closer, Bangladesh must push hard to renegotiate the Ganges Water Treaty so that it matches today’s realities. Climate change has changed rainfall patterns, bringing more droughts and floods, but the 1996 treaty still sticks to fixed water-sharing rules that don’t adjust to these new challenges. Leading Bangladeshi water experts are calling for real-time data sharing and stronger agreements that would force India to stick to its promises. However, the Joint Rivers Commission meeting held in Kolkata in March 2025 led to lots of technical talks but no real progress, showing just how slowly things are moving.

Meanwhile, the Teesta River issue remains stuck. Northern Bangladesh is dealing with serious water shortages during the dry season. Farmers there have to rely on underground water for about 98% of their irrigation—a solution that’s expensive and can’t last forever. According to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the lack of water from the Teesta is costing Bangladesh around 1.5 million tons of Boro rice every year—that’s about 8.9% of the country’s total rice production. If nothing changes, losses could rise by 8% by 2030 and by 14% by 2050. This matters hugely for Bangladesh because farming still employs over 70% of the rural population and is key to keeping the economy stable.

Food and Floods: Bangladesh’s Big Risks

The Ganges and Teesta rivers are absolutely critical to Bangladesh’s food supply. The Ganges waters farms in the southwest, but when less water flows in, salt from the sea creeps into the soil, ruining farmland and making it impossible to grow crops. Over in the Teesta region, farmers are facing serious water shortages, forcing them to stop growing water-hungry crops like rice and switch to less profitable ones. This pushes up their irrigation costs and traps many in deeper poverty. The effects ripple outward: rural families are forced to move, and food prices rise in cities as supplies shrink.

Floods make things even worse. Without an agreement in place to control the Teesta’s flow, the river floods unpredictably during the monsoon season. Past disasters, like the floods of 1987 and 1988, drowned up to 60% of the country, wiping out crops and smashing infrastructure. On the flip side, when the Ganges river dries up during droughts, millions struggle to get enough water. A working deal between Bangladesh and India could help even out the river flows and protect both sides from these extremes—but so far, no deal has been made, leaving Bangladesh wide open to future disasters.

India’s Indus Treaty Move: A Warning Sign

When India suspended its Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan on 23 April 2025—after a terrorist attack killed 26 people in Pahalgam, Kashmir—the shock was felt far beyond the India-Pakistan border. For Bangladesh, it sent a chilling message: water could now be used as a political weapon. The Indus treaty, signed back in 1960, had survived wars and political crises, so its sudden suspension—justified by India as a security measure—made Bangladesh wonder if its own water deals were safe. It raised fears that when push comes to shove, India might put its own needs and strategies ahead of fair water sharing.

Ordinary people in Bangladesh are clearly worried. On social media platforms, users vented their anger, blaming India’s dams and barrages for worsening droughts, floods, and killing river ecosystems. Some even called for Bangladesh to take legal steps to stop India from “weaponizing” water. India’s move on the Indus has fired up demands for Bangladesh to negotiate harder—and even look for new partners like China, which has shown interest in investing in the Teesta basin.

Roadblocks at Home and Between Neighbours

The water disputes aren’t just about rivers—they’re tangled up in complicated politics. In India, water is mainly controlled by individual states, not the national government. That’s why West Bengal’s refusal to support the Teesta agreement has become such a big problem. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee wants to protect her own farmers, but this stand-off frustrates Bangladesh and puts extra strain on the relationship between the two countries. India’s central government is trying to keep talks going with Bangladesh, but it has to work around these internal political hurdles.

In Bangladesh, the interim government, led by Chief Advisor Prof. Mohammed Yunus, has made water security a top priority and is keeping up diplomatic efforts with India. However, people at home are getting more and more impatient for real results. The Joint Rivers Commission is supposed to be the main platform for solving these issues, but so far, it hasn’t managed to fix the big problems—like how West Bengal effectively has the power to block any deal. This failure is making many Bangladeshis lose faith in these talks. India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty has also made things worse, encouraging some in Bangladesh to call for taking the disputes to international courts. But India strongly opposes letting outsiders get involved, which makes that path very difficult.

Forecasting the Future: Scenarios

The expiration of the Ganges treaty in 2026 is shaping up to be a major turning point, with a few possible futures ahead. One option is a successful renegotiation, where a new treaty could be crafted to allow for flexible water sharing based on real-time climate data, backed by stronger enforcement measures. Achieving this would demand political commitment from India and cooperation from West Bengal, which would be difficult but not impossible if there is enough goodwill on both sides. Another possibility is that talks stall completely, bogged down by India’s internal politics or growing frustration in Bangladesh, leaving the outdated treaty in place or even causing it to collapse altogether, which would worsen Bangladesh’s water problems and further damage bilateral relations. There is also the chance that Bangladesh will seek new ways forward, perhaps by appealing to international law like the UN Convention on Watercourses or by calling for outside technical help, moves that are risky but might put pressure on India to respond. As for the Teesta River, progress depends heavily on overcoming West Bengal’s resistance; signing an agreement could help improve relations, but wider geopolitical factors—like China’s increasing interest in the region—make the situation more complicated. New ideas, like setting up joint research projects or forums where farmers from both India and Bangladesh can have their say, could offer fresh ways to break the deadlock.

Recommendations for Bangladesh

To protect its water future, Bangladesh needs to take several steps at once. It should strengthen its diplomacy with India by focusing on the shared benefits of cooperation, like better food security, flood control, and overall regional stability, and push for high-level meetings that could build momentum for agreements. Even without going for formal international mediation, Bangladesh can still seek help from groups like the World Bank to get technical advice on managing water resources more sustainably. At home, it should invest heavily in building more reservoirs, making irrigation systems more efficient, and strengthening flood defences so it is less dependent on rivers coming from outside its borders. Bangladesh should also work to restart broader regional talks, perhaps by BIMSTEC, to reframe water not as a source of conflict but as a shared South Asian issue that demands cooperation.

Conclusion

The Ganges and Teesta River disputes highlight how vulnerable Bangladesh is as a country downstream in a region where water is already scarce. India’s recent suspension of the Indus treaty has made the situation even more serious, pushing Bangladesh to work harder to protect its rights as regional politics grow more unpredictable. With farming, natural ecosystems, and the lives of millions depending on these rivers, finding solutions has become more urgent than ever and will require fresh ideas and real cooperation. As the 2026 deadline approaches, Bangladesh faces a crucial moment, and the way it handles this challenge will have a lasting impact on its strength as a nation and its future relationship with India.

————-
Geopolits Research Desk
__________

Related

Post navigation

← The Pahalgam Attack: Indus Waters Treaty and Deep Crisis in India-Pakistan Relations
Bangladesh and the UN Humanitarian Corridor to Rakhine State →

Post Types

  • Post (269)
  • Page (2)

Categories

  • Indo-Pacific regions (172)
  • South Asia (169)
  • America (128)
  • Middle East (100)
  • Eastern Europe and Russia (83)

Tags

  • USA (137)
  • China (102)
  • India (99)
  • Bangladesh (88)
  • Russia (77)

Year

  • 2025 (74)
  • 2024 (42)
  • 2023 (36)
  • 2022 (41)
  • 2021 (7)

Editor's Pick

https://geopolits.com/2025/03/24/indias-geopolitical-tightrope-is-balancing-the-us-and-russia-amidst-a-shifting-global-order/
© 2025 Geopolits | Powered by Minimalist Blog WordPress Theme
Manage Consent
To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
Functional Always active
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
Preferences
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
Statistics
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes. The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
Marketing
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.
Manage options Manage services Manage {vendor_count} vendors Read more about these purposes
View preferences
{title} {title} {title}