On Teesta River
The Teesta River is more than just a river. For millions of people in Bangladesh and India, it’s a lifeline. The river starts in India’s Sikkim state, flows through West Bengal, and finally enters northern Bangladesh, where it joins the Brahmaputra. Farmers in both countries depend on it for irrigation, and its waters affect everything from crops and food prices to political relations and even international diplomacy.
But for decades, India and Bangladesh haven’t been able to agree on how to share the Teesta’s water—especially during the dry season when water levels drop. Now, in 2025, this long-standing problem has become even more complicated, with China entering the scene, internal political changes in Bangladesh, and a growing climate crisis.
A Dispute That’s Been Around for Over 70 Years
The roots of this water-sharing issue go back to the 1950s. After the partition of British India, the newly formed nations of India and Pakistan (before Bangladesh became independent in 1971) started discussing how to divide water from shared rivers. One of the key negotiation points was the Teesta.
In 1983, a temporary agreement was reached—India would get 39% of the water, and Bangladesh 36%. But that deal was never formalised. Then in 2011, both sides came close again. India proposed keeping 42.5% and giving Bangladesh 37.5%. But Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal, blocked the deal, saying it would hurt her state’s farmers.
Since then, things have largely stayed stuck. There’s been talk and diplomacy, but as of April 2025, there is still no official agreement. During the dry months—December to March—Bangladesh often gets far less water, and it’s hurting agriculture badly.
Agriculture and Food Security in Bangladesh at Risk
For Bangladesh, the Teesta is critical. Farmers in northern districts like Lalmonirhat and Rangpur depend on it to grow rice, vegetables, and other crops. But as dry-season flows have dropped—from around 6,500 cusecs (cubic feet per second) in 1997 to just 300 cusecs in 2016—large areas of land have become uncultivable.
In fact, only about 35% of the farmland was under cultivation in some years like 2013–14. This forced farmers to switch to less water-dependent but lower-value crops like maize and tobacco. It also meant higher costs for irrigation, less income, and greater poverty in these areas.
Environmental issues like silting, river erosion, and loss of biodiversity have made things worse. If this situation continues, food shortages and rural distress may grow, forcing people to migrate or rely more on government aid or foreign assistance.
Why West Bengal Is Blocking the Deal
From West Bengal’s perspective, sharing more Teesta water isn’t simple. The river irrigates large areas of North Bengal, including Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar. Around 27% of West Bengal’s population lives in the Teesta basin, and they rely on the river for farming and drinking water.
Mamata Banerjee and her state government believe that giving more water to Bangladesh could cause water shortages for their own people. Her resistance has deep political roots—it plays well with her voters, especially in a politically sensitive region. In India, water is controlled by both the central government and the states. So, even if Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants to make a deal with Bangladesh, he needs West Bengal’s cooperation—and that has been hard to get.
China Steps in with a New Geopolitical Twist
In recent years, China has started playing a more active role in South Asia’s water politics. Back in 2016, the Chinese company PowerChina proposed a $1 billion project to restore and manage the Teesta in Bangladesh. The plan includes building embankments, dredging the riverbed, and improving irrigation systems.
For a while, this project was on hold. But in March 2025, Bangladesh, under its new interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, officially welcomed China’s involvement. Agreements were signed for cooperation, including sharing hydrological data and discussing long-term infrastructure development.
This has made India nervous. China is already building huge dams on the upper parts of the Brahmaputra River (called the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet), which could affect water flow to both India and Bangladesh. With China now involved in the Teesta as well, a new layer of geopolitical tension has emerged.
A New Push for Resolution
In August 2024, Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s long-time Prime Minister, was removed from power following mass protests. Dr. Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize winner and microfinance pioneer, took over as head of an interim government.
Dr. Yunus has made resolving the Teesta dispute a top priority. In April 2025, he met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok. He pushed for a final agreement on the Teesta and also asked India to renew the Ganges Water Treaty, which is due to expire soon. He said, “Bangladesh deeply values its relationship with India,” but made it clear that action was needed.
So far, however, no progress has been reported. The main stumbling block remains West Bengal’s opposition, combined with India’s broader concerns about growing Chinese influence in Bangladesh.
What Happens If the Dispute Isn’t Resolved?
If India and Bangladesh can’t reach a water-sharing deal soon, the consequences could be serious:
For Bangladesh: Continued water shortages will hurt agriculture, food security, and rural jobs. It may also lead to more reliance on China, both financially and diplomatically, potentially drawing Bangladesh further into China’s sphere of influence.
For India: A failure to resolve the issue could weaken its influence in South Asia. With China already active in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, losing ground in Bangladesh would be a major strategic blow. It may also worsen tensions between the Indian central government and West Bengal.
Regionally: Climate change is already altering the flow of Himalayan rivers. Glaciers are melting faster, and extreme weather is becoming more common. A 2023 glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) in Sikkim showed how fragile the situation is. Experts warn of more floods followed by dry spells, making a clear, flexible water-sharing framework essential.
Geoeconomic Impacts: Trade and investment could suffer. If tensions grow between India and Bangladesh, or between either of them and China, businesses may become hesitant to invest in the region.
How Can This Be Solved?
A lasting solution won’t be easy, but it’s possible if all sides show flexibility and vision. Some potential steps include:
1. Formalising a Teesta treaty that balances both countries’ needs and includes seasonal flexibility.
2. Involving neutral third parties like international river management bodies to mediate and monitor flows.
3. Building climate-adaptive infrastructure, such as water reservoirs and smart irrigation systems.
4. Including West Bengal in the negotiations in a formal way, so its concerns are heard and addressed.
5. Encouraging trilateral dialogue between India, Bangladesh, and China to manage shared rivers more cooperatively.
Time for Cooperation Over Conflict
The Teesta River dispute is about more than water. It’s about food, jobs, politics, and power in one of the world’s most densely populated and climate-vulnerable regions. With China’s growing involvement, India and Bangladesh have even more reason to come to the table.
Dr. Yunus’s leadership has created a new opportunity to break the deadlock. But unless all sides—especially India and West Bengal—find a way to cooperate, the dispute could lead to greater instability. The time to act is now, before climate change and geopolitical rivalries make it even harder to find common ground.
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Rajeev Ahmed
The Editor of Geopolits.com and the Author of the book titled Bengal Nexus
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