On Maldives and China
The Maldives is a small island country with about 524,000 people, spread out across the Indian Ocean, about 750 km southwest of India and Sri Lanka. Its location is important because it’s near key shipping routes that carry about 80% of China’s oil. This has drawn the attention of major world powers. While the Maldives traditionally had close ties with India and Western countries, its leaders have grown closer to China since the early 2000s. The Maldives and China officially began diplomatic relations in 1972 and celebrated 50 years of ties in 2022. Over time, their relationship has grown stronger, involving big infrastructure projects, increasing loans and investments, and more military and diplomatic cooperation—especially under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Historical Background (1970s–2010)
The Maldives gained independence from British rule in 1965 and became a republic in 1968. During the Cold War, this small, mostly Muslim country chose not to take sides but relied on India for economic help and security. A turning point came in 1988, when India stepped in with a military operation (called Operation Cactus) to stop a coup, which solidified India’s role as the Maldives’ main security partner.
China, on the other hand, had only a small role. The two countries first set up diplomatic relations in 1972 under President Ibrahim Nasir, but for many years China didn’t have much influence. Under President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who led from 1978 to 2008, Chinese involvement was minimal—mostly small projects like building a fishing harbour or a police station. The Maldives’ economy stayed closely tied to India and Western tourism. Gayoom’s government supported China’s One-China policy (agreeing that Taiwan is part of China) and saw China as a friendly country, but there wasn’t any major strategic partnership.
Boom under President Yameen (2013–2018)
This balance changed sharply when Abdulla Yameen became president of the Maldives from 2013 to 2018. Yameen turned strongly toward China to fund fast-paced infrastructure development. In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Maldives, bringing promises of big projects and pledging support for Yameen’s development plans. During the visit, the Maldives signed an agreement to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and awarded a major airport expansion deal to a Chinese company—cancelling a previous contract with an Indian firm. Xi also promoted the Maritime Silk Road and encouraged Chinese businesses to invest more in the Maldives.
Under Yameen, Chinese money flowed into major infrastructure. The flagship project was the China–Maldives Friendship Bridge (also called Sinamalé Bridge), connecting the capital Malé with the airport island Hulhulé and the new township of Hulhumalé. Finished in 2018, the 1.4-kilometre bridge cost around $200 million, with China directly funding much of it. Other Chinese-backed projects included a major airport upgrade, thousands of housing units, and power infrastructure like grids and power plants. Altogether, Chinese loans and commitments during this period are estimated to have reached around $1.5 billion.
These investments spurred a construction boom but also sparked concern. Former president Mohamed Nasheed later claimed that China handed the Maldives a $3.2 billion bill for these projects—something Beijing denied. Critics feared the country could fall into a “debt trap” like Sri Lanka, which had to hand over a port to China due to unpaid debt. Though China dismissed such warnings, even Chinese experts admitted the Maldives’ rising debt—20–40% owed to China—was risky.
India was deeply uneasy during this time. It watched as Yameen explored possible Chinese projects like building a harbour in the south and even a Chinese-operated ocean observatory in the north. India worried these could have military uses. One deal to set up a Joint Ocean Observation Station was signed in 2017 but later cancelled by Yameen’s successor. Yameen claimed all projects were civilian and for development, but India and some Maldivians saw it as a shift that sidelined India.
Recalibration under President Solih (2018–2023)
In the 2018 presidential election, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih—backed by former president Mohamed Nasheed’s party—came to power, largely by criticising former president Yameen’s heavy reliance on Chinese loans. Once in office, Solih quickly shifted the country’s foreign policy. He rebuilt strong ties with India, which responded with generous economic aid and technical help, including support for Maldivian resorts, healthcare, and education.
At the same time, Solih began reviewing Chinese-backed projects. Some were cancelled or paused, such as the ocean observatory at Makunudhoo, a planned Chinese-standard power plant, and the airport runway extension (which was later resumed). In 2019, Solih’s government admitted it didn’t even know the total amount of Chinese debt and launched audits of all such deals.
Solih also tried to raise the Maldives’ international profile. During his presidency, the Maldives briefly held a rotating leadership role in the UN Security Council and pursued more balanced, multilateral diplomacy. While the Maldives still worked with China—finishing the Sinamalé Bridge and accepting COVID-19 vaccine donations—it also leaned on support from India and Western countries. A 2024 IMF report warned that the Maldives’ debt was dangerously high: a 13.4% fiscal deficit and public debt at 119% of GDP. The report didn’t single out China, but analysts noted that Chinese loans made up the biggest chunk of foreign debt.
To reduce China’s strategic influence, Solih also strengthened military cooperation with India. This included letting Indian forces help with logistics at Malé and Gan until March 2024. India also gave Maldives patrol boats, a communications satellite, and engineers to maintain Maldivian aircraft. These moves signalled India’s effort to keep the Maldives from sliding too far into Beijing’s orbit.
Between 2018 and 2023, the Maldives tried to walk a fine line. It stayed in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and accepted help from Chinese companies on projects like a sewerage system, a national power grid upgrade, and a floating solar farm. At the same time, it rebuilt partnerships with India, Japan, and the West. China, for its part, kept up soft diplomacy—offering praise, aid, and cultural initiatives like opening a Chinese cultural centre at Maldivian universities. It also donated 200,000 vaccine doses during the pandemic. By mid-2023, Chinese businesses were again active in the Maldives, selling power equipment and digital services, and Chinese tourists were returning in large numbers—helping the country’s tourism sector recover after COVID-19.
Renewed Outreach under President Muizzu (2023–Present)
In the September 2023 election, Mohamed Muizzu—who had been housing minister under former president Yameen and belonged to the same PPM party—won power by running a campaign focused on removing Indian influence. His “India-Out” message accused then-president Solih of relying too much on India. Muizzu also raised concerns about how Islam was being treated in the Maldives and criticised India’s treatment of its Muslim population to appeal to conservative voters.
After his election victory, Muizzu quickly shifted foreign policy toward China. In a break from tradition (where Maldivian leaders usually visited India first), he chose China for his first state visit in January 2024. He brought along many top officials and journalists, and met Chinese President Xi Jinping, who reaffirmed China’s support for the Maldives’ development and security. The visit resulted in an upgraded “comprehensive strategic partnership” and around 20 new agreements in areas like trade, culture, technology, and security.
Most notably, on 4 March 2024, the Maldivian Defence Minister and a Chinese general signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement. It promised free Chinese military aid, including equipment and training—marking the first formal Chinese military assistance deal in South Asia. While not all details were made public, the announcement signaled a significant step in military ties between the two countries.
At the same time, Muizzu insisted that all Indian military technicians still stationed in the Maldives leave by March 15, 2024. India agreed—but replaced its military personnel with civilian engineers, a rare move. In response, India strengthened its own military presence nearby by opening a new naval base on Minicoy Island (in the Lakshadweep Islands), just 125 km north of the Maldives.
The United States reacted carefully. A U.S. State Department spokesperson said they were watching the Maldives-China defence deal but highlighted America’s six-decade-long relationship with the Maldives and its interest in ongoing cooperation. By June 2024, the Maldivian ambassador in Washington publicly said the country values its ties with the U.S., China, and India equally, and aims to follow a balanced foreign policy.
Economic and Infrastructure Cooperation
China has become one of the Maldives’ biggest economic partners. By 2024, China was the second- or third-largest source of tourists to the Maldives, following Russia and India. That year, about 263,000 Chinese tourists visited, making up nearly 13% of all international arrivals. Maldivian authorities actively encouraged more Chinese tourism by launching direct flights to major Chinese cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Chongqing, and teaming up with Chinese travel agencies.
Trade between the two countries is uneven. China sends a lot of goods to the Maldives—like electronics, construction materials, and food—but the Maldives sends very little back, mostly small amounts of fish. Even though trade volumes are modest, China has poured a huge amount of money into the country through investments and loans. Since 2013, Chinese state and commercial banks have loaned over $1 billion to the Maldives, with a 2024 report estimating about $1.4 billion in total Chinese debt—roughly 20% of the Maldives’ total public debt. According to the IMF, this contributed to the country’s debt reaching nearly 119% of its GDP by the end of 2023, due mostly to large-scale imports for infrastructure projects.
Some of the most important infrastructure in the Maldives today has been built by China. Aside from the well-known China–Maldives Friendship Bridge (connecting Malé to Hulhulé and Hulhumalé), Chinese firms have built key roads and bridges, financed mostly by the Chinese government. The bridge alone has seen over 100 million crossings since it opened in 2018.
China also funded the expansion of Velana International Airport, which was originally supposed to be handled by an Indian firm (GMR) but was later given to China’s Shanghai Construction Group. That project, completed in stages by 2022, doubled the airport’s capacity and allowed more tourists to enter the country. Other major Chinese-backed projects include the national stadium, a new medical school building, and an unfinished international convention centre. China has also financed sewer and power upgrades, and thousands of low-cost housing units to help reduce poverty.
Overall, China’s economic role in the Maldives includes a mix of loans, grants, and business contracts. Maldivian leaders often say this partnership has helped modernise the country and improve everyday life through better roads, housing, and utilities. However, critics argue that the rush of Chinese-funded projects—especially during Yameen’s presidency—was too fast and possibly unsustainable. They worry about the long-term costs, especially the burden of repaying loans. The IMF has warned that without better financial planning, the Maldives faces a serious risk of debt problems. So, while Chinese investments have clearly boosted growth and development, they’ve also raised concerns about the country’s future financial health.
Debt and Financial Dynamics
The Maldives’ debt to China has sparked a lot of debate. During President Yameen’s time in office, the Maldives borrowed large sums from Chinese government-backed banks, especially the Export-Import Bank of China. When President Solih took over, his advisor, former president Mohamed Nasheed, claimed China was demanding $3.2 billion for all the projects it funded. China denied this and said the actual amount was closer to $1.5 billion—an estimate supported by the Maldivian central bank. However, that $1.5 billion doesn’t include other Chinese-backed guarantees to Maldivian state-owned companies or loans to semi-governmental developers, meaning the true debt could be even higher.
As of 2023, the Maldives owed China about five times more than it owed India. One report said about 25% of the Maldives’ foreign debt was to China, while only around 2% was owed to India. Each year, the Maldives has to pay about $90–100 million to China in loan repayments, which is about 10% of the entire national budget. India’s financial help has mostly come in the form of smaller loans or grants focused on training and development, rather than big infrastructure.
The exact terms of the Chinese loans aren’t always clear, but some appear to be at relatively low interest rates. Still, experts worry that if tourism (a major source of income) slows down or if foreign currency reserves shrink, it could be hard for the Maldives to keep up with debt payments.
The IMF and other financial institutions have warned that the Maldives must rein in its spending. Public debt is expected to peak at nearly 120% of the country’s GDP. The IMF has urged the government to make serious cuts and reform its finances to avoid a debt crisis. Organisations like the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and countries like India—and possibly even China—have offered advice or discussed restructuring options. Between 2020 and 2022, the Maldives got a $94 million grant from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (which China co-founded), but that money was mostly meant for climate-related projects, not for paying off debt.
Till date, the Maldives has been trying to diversify its sources of funding. This includes issuing sukuk bonds (Islamic bonds in local currency) to reduce its dependence on foreign loans.
Military and Security Cooperation
In the past, the Maldives didn’t have any real military connection with China. Its small armed forces—mainly the Marine Corps and Coast Guard—have long been trained and equipped by India, with some occasional help from the U.S. India has had a defence role in the Maldives since 1988, when it sent troops to stop a coup. Since then, a small number of Indian military personnel stayed to provide technical help. China, on the other hand, had almost no military involvement—until recently.
That changed in a big way in 2024. On 4 March, the Maldives and China signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement. This deal marked a major shift: China agreed to give the Maldives free military aid—meaning the Maldives doesn’t have to pay it back. This aid includes things like vehicles, uniforms, communication equipment, and training for Maldivian troops in China. The deal was signed by the Maldivian Defence Minister and a Chinese general, and was openly promoted as a move to strengthen their relationship. While the full details haven’t been made public, reports suggest it’s mostly non-lethal support.
At the same time, the Maldives started pulling back from its defence relationship with India. By the end of 2023, President Muizzu asked that all Indian military technicians (who had been maintaining aircraft India had donated) leave the country by March 2024. India agreed, replacing them with civilian workers. This effectively ended India’s military presence in the Maldives—a sharp reversal from the previous government, which had welcomed Indian support.
With India stepping back, China has moved in more visibly. Chinese navy and coast guard ships have started visiting Maldivian ports. For instance, in February 2024, a Chinese research ship docked in Malé after doing surveys in waters near both India and the Maldives. India raised concerns, warning that such “research” ships might also collect data for military use, like tracking submarines. China insisted the mission was peaceful.
Previously, Chinese warships only stopped by briefly as part of goodwill visits, and joint activities were mostly limited to disaster relief or scientific exercises. Now, the Maldivian military is reportedly receiving training from Chinese experts, although there are few public details.
There’s no official alliance between China and the Maldives, but their military cooperation is clearly growing. The Maldives has been included in China’s Global Security Initiative, and Beijing appears interested in maintaining a friendly relationship with the country due to its location on key Indian Ocean shipping routes. India, meanwhile, has stepped up its monitoring of the area, including from its new naval base on Lakshadweep, and continues to offer its own regional partnerships through programmes like “Neighbourhood First.”
Diplomatic and Political Alignments
Politically and diplomatically, the Maldives and China have grown closer in recent years. Visits between top leaders from both sides have become common. China’s President Xi Jinping visited the Maldives back in 2014, and since then, many Maldivian officials have travelled to China. At one point in 2017–18, they even signed a deal to run a marine observatory together, although that plan was later dropped. In 2022, the Maldivian Environment Minister visited China to explore joint environmental projects, and President Muizzu’s 2024 visit to Beijing was the most high-profile meeting since Xi’s own trip a decade earlier.
The Maldives has also started taking part in more China-led events and forums. For instance, its Vice President attended the China-sponsored Indian Ocean Forum in 2023. Chinese officials frequently come to Malé for Belt and Road Initiative meetings and training sessions. At the United Nations, the Maldives often votes in line with China on big international issues. China has publicly appreciated the Maldives for backing its stances, including support for the One-China policy and global development proposals.
In return, Maldivian leaders have also asked for China’s backing on political matters. For example, in 2014, President Yameen cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan—after briefly recognising it—and reaffirmed support for Beijing’s position on the issue. During the 2018 Commonwealth Games, the Maldives joined many countries in endorsing a Chinese-led statement on global security. More recently, Maldivian officials have used Chinese investment as a way to show they’re building diverse foreign ties—subtly signalling a shift away from India’s previous influence.
This shift became especially clear under President Muizzu. His trip to Beijing in 2024 came during a time of worsening relations with India. During his election campaign, Muizzu accused India of interfering in Maldivian internal affairs and presented China as a more neutral partner. Tensions rose further after an incident in January 2024, when the Indian Coast Guard boarded Maldivian fishing boats inside the Maldives’ exclusive economic zone. This led to a formal protest from Malé. Then, by March, the Maldives officially asked India to remove its remaining technical staff by May 2024—a request India accepted.
These actions make it clear that the Maldives is shifting away from its long-standing status as one of India’s closest allies and is now positioning China as a key partner. That said, Malé hasn’t cut off its other relationships. The Maldivian ambassador to the U.S. recently said the country still considers India, China, and the U.S. all important for stability in the Indian Ocean. Essentially, the Maldives is trying to balance ties with multiple major powers, using each relationship to its advantage while also managing internal political dynamics.
Soft Power and Cultural Engagement
China’s influence in the Maldives through soft power is growing, especially in areas like tourism, education, and cultural exchanges. Tourism is the biggest driver: even before the pandemic, the number of Chinese visitors to the Maldives was rising fast. By 2024, China became the third-largest source of tourists, after Russia and India. The Maldives tourism board and Chinese travel agencies work together to promote Maldives resorts as a vacation spot for Chinese tourists, with special deals around Chinese New Year attracting tens of thousands of visitors each February. More flights from Chinese cities and visa exemptions for Chinese nationals have helped fuel this growth. As a result, Chinese tourists now make up over 10% of all arrivals, contributing hundreds of millions of dollars to the local economy.
Cultural and educational exchanges have also increased. In 2020, the first Confucius Institute in the Maldives was opened at Villa College to teach Mandarin and Chinese culture. More Maldivian students are receiving scholarships to study at Chinese universities. Chinese media are taking more interest in the Maldives, often highlighting the country’s development under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and quoting Maldivian officials. In return, Maldivian media frequently cover Chinese officials’ visits, showing a positive view of their cooperation.
On the humanitarian front, China has provided medical aid to the Maldives. In 2018, China gave the Maldivian Coast Guard a “sea ambulance” – a 26-meter vessel equipped as a floating clinic. This was part of a promise made by President Xi in 2014, and it included training for Maldivian medical staff. Chinese medical teams have also visited the Maldives for training and health programs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, China donated vaccines and medical supplies, which were gratefully received in Malé. These actions help strengthen China’s image as a partner in development.
However, China’s growing influence in the Maldives is not without controversy. Some opposition politicians and activists worry that China’s cultural presence could weaken local identity or be used to drive a wedge between the Maldives and India. Critics often point to Chinese language lessons as an example of China gaining too much influence over the younger generation in the Maldives. There have also been protests over Chinese-run resorts and construction projects that impact the environment, such as coral reefs and fisheries. Still, China’s cultural outreach – through tourism, language teaching, and media – continues to grow, supporting its stronger economic and military ties with the Maldives.
Regional and Geopolitical Context
The Maldives’ growing ties with China should be viewed within the larger context of the ongoing competition between major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Traditionally within India’s sphere of influence, the Maldives has now become a point of tension between India and China. India sees the Indian Ocean and the surrounding islands as its strategic domain, and China’s involvement in countries like Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, and Djibouti is part of a broader narrative called the “String of Pearls,” which India views as a challenge to its regional influence. The Maldives plays a critical role in this, sitting along a busy shipping route from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia, making it an important area for both countries to maintain influence and access.
From China’s perspective, the Maldives is strategically located near major shipping lanes, offering opportunities for logistics support, such as port access and emergency docking, as well as surveillance capabilities. Reports suggest that almost 80% of China’s imported oil passes near the Maldives, so maintaining friendly relations with the country is key for Beijing. By funding infrastructure projects and offering economic incentives, China seeks to keep the Maldives as an ally that won’t block Chinese shipping during conflicts or crises.
India, on the other hand, cannot afford to lose the Maldives to China entirely. India has strengthened its ties with the Maldives through aid, including a $1.4 billion credit line in 2019, as well as infrastructure support and security cooperation. India has consistently played a role in Maldivian politics, offering diplomatic support to opposition leaders, and civil society in the Maldives remains divided on whether the country should align more with India or China. The tension between the two nations was highlighted by a recent incident in January 2024, when Indian coast guard personnel boarded Maldivian fishing boats. In response, India has increased its presence by opening a new surveillance base on Minicoy Island and escorting fuel shipments to the Maldives, signaling its determination to protect its interests. This has created a new tug-of-war between India and China in the Maldives.
Other external players, like the United States, Japan, and Australia, also have a stake in the Maldives’ direction. The U.S. has a strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” which includes the Maldives as a partner, focusing on maritime security and counterterrorism efforts. While the U.S. has been cautious about China’s growing influence, it continues to support the Maldives through development and security cooperation. Japan and Australia share India’s concerns and have offered aid, especially in climate and infrastructure projects, in an effort to counterbalance China’s influence. Meanwhile, Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE compete with China for investments in the Maldives, driven by both religious and economic interests.
The Maldives, for its part, is trying to navigate these pressures by pursuing a strategy of multi-alignment, seeking to engage with all major powers equally. Muizzu’s government emphasizes that the Maldives should not be forced into choosing a side but should instead focus on maximizing aid and investment from all partners. However, the balance of power is shifting, and the Maldives appears to be leaning more toward China as India’s influence diminishes. This shift has raised concerns among neighboring countries, with Indian media questioning whether the Maldives is moving too far into China’s orbit, while China promotes the Maldives as an example of successful South-South cooperation.
Conclusion
Over the past fifty years, the relationship between the Maldives and China has transformed from formal diplomatic interactions into a deep strategic partnership. What started as limited engagement from the 1970s to the 2000s has grown into a complex involvement across multiple areas: China is now a key player in the Maldives’ economy, infrastructure, and increasingly, its security. For the Maldives, China provides fast development funding and offers an alternative to traditional aid sources, but this comes with the risk of rising debt and geopolitical tensions. The country’s governments have fluctuated in their approach to China, sometimes warming to the relationship and at other times pulling back, influenced by both domestic politics and external pressures. However, the overall trend shows a growing Chinese presence.
Experts warn that the Maldives needs to handle this relationship carefully. Over-relying on Chinese loans could jeopardize financial stability, while upsetting India—like in the 2024 crisis—could pose risks to the country’s security. Despite these concerns, the current Maldivian government views China as a “close ally and development partner.” In the broader context of the Indian Ocean, the Maldives has become a key strategic area where India, China, the U.S., and others are vying for influence. To fully understand this evolving relationship, one must look at both the infrastructure projects and the diplomatic moves—such as building bridges and airports, signing military agreements, and promoting tourism. As of mid-2025, relations between the Maldives and China are at their peak, but how deeply they become intertwined will depend on future economic outcomes and shifts in regional politics.
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Geopolits Research Desk
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