On India
India, the world’s third-largest oil consumer and an emerging economic powerhouse, stands at a perilous crossroads in 2025. Caught between the unrelenting pressure of the United States and the steadfast partnership of Russia, New Delhi’s foreign policy is a high-stakes gamble that reveals both its ambitions and its vulnerabilities. This article delves into India’s delicate balancing act with the US and Russia, its fraught relationship with China, and its broader geopolitical maneuvers, offering a harshly critical lens on its strategies, their regional implications, and the roadblocks that threaten its aspirations to become a rich, globally influential nation.
India’s energy security, a linchpin of its economic stability, is under siege. With 87% of its crude oil needs met through imports—a figure projected to climb to 89% by year-end—New Delhi faces a stark dilemma. The US, under President Donald Trump’s administration in early 2025, has intensified its campaign to wean India off Russian oil, leveraging sanctions and tariff threats. Data from Vortexa underscores the impact: Russian crude shipments to India dropped 25% in February 2025, from 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd) in January to 1.07 million bpd, following US sanctions on Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and 183 oil tankers. Meanwhile, US oil exports to India surged to 0.2 million bpd, doubling from 0.11 million bpd the previous month, aligning with India’s $25 billion pledge to boost American energy purchases.
But, Russia remains India’s energy anchor. In 2023, discounted Russian oil saved India $5 billion, a financial lifeline amidst global price volatility. Moscow’s shorter delivery routes and strategic discounts—unmatched by the market-priced American oil—offer a resilience that New Delhi cannot easily discard. Rosatom’s offer to transfer small modular reactor technology further deepens this partnership, promising sustainable energy options that align with India’s long-term goals. Severing this tie, as the US demands, risks inflationary shocks and energy insecurity, a scenario India’s leadership deems untenable.
The US, however, wields a heavy stick. Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, announced on April 2, 2025, threaten India’s $190 billion bilateral trade, with potential export losses of $7 billion annually due to India’s 17% average tariff rate dwarfing the US’s 3.3%. Defense ties are also strained, with threats to delay military equipment deliveries—a move that could hobble India’s modernization efforts against China and Pakistan. Washington’s transactional approach contrasts sharply with Russia’s enduring strategic alignment, exposing India to a coercive diplomacy it has long resisted.
India’s refusal to fully capitulate to US pressure is less a triumph of strategic autonomy than a desperate clinging to a crumbling status quo. By expanding its oil basket to 39 countries (up from 29), including Iraq and Nigeria, India dilutes its reliance on any single supplier—but this diversification is a Band-Aid, not a cure. The lack of a coherent energy strategy leaves India vulnerable to both American retaliation and Russian leverage, undermining its claims of geopolitical resilience.
India’s relationship with China is a volatile cocktail of confrontation and fleeting cooperation, shaped by a 3,488-kilometer disputed border and clashing regional ambitions. Since the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which killed 20 Indian soldiers, tensions have simmered, erupting into skirmishes like the 2022 Tawang incident in Arunachal Pradesh. China’s belligerence in the South China Sea and its expanding Indian Ocean presence—via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—further stoke India’s fears of encirclement, particularly through Pakistan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Data points to at least 12 significant military standoffs since 2014, including Doklam (2017) and Pangong Tso (2020-2021), with troop buildups exceeding 100,000 on both sides at peak moments. India’s $15 billion border infrastructure push since 2020—roads, tunnels, and airfields—reflects a hardening stance, yet it pales against China’s $500 billion BRI investments, which dwarf India’s regional influence.
Rare instances of alignment include the 2015 Nepal earthquake relief efforts, where both nations provided aid, and their joint stance in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) against Western-dominated climate finance frameworks. In 2021, India and China co-sponsored a WTO proposal for equitable vaccine distribution, a brief nod to Global South solidarity. However, these moments are outliers in a relationship defined by mistrust.
India’s China policy is a masterclass in reactive posturing rather than proactive strategy. Its inability to match China’s economic heft—India’s 2025 GDP is projected at $4.7 trillion, versus China’s $19 trillion—leaves it scrambling to counter Beijing’s influence in South Asia, from Sri Lanka to the Maldives. New Delhi’s obsession with military parity blinds it to the soft power deficit that cedes regional leadership to China.
India’s balancing act reverberates across South Asia, particularly in Bangladesh, where political upheaval in 2024—Sheikh Hasina’s exile to India—has strained ties. Dhaka’s interim government under Muhammad Yunus, wary of India’s perceived meddling, leans toward China.
In the broader region, India’s multi-alignment alienates smaller neighbors. Nepal’s pro-China tilt under K.P. Sharma Oli and the Maldives’ warming ties with Beijing under Mohamed Muizzu highlight India’s failure to offer compelling alternatives to China’s largesse. Pakistan, bolstered by CPEC, remains a thorn, with India’s muted response to cross-border terrorism signaling strategic paralysis.
India’s regional hegemony is a myth propped up by rhetoric, not reality. Its inability to stabilize South Asia—evidenced by Bangladesh’s drift and Pakistan’s defiance—undermines its global ambitions, leaving the US and Russia to question its reliability as a partner.
Western views of India’s outreach are mixed, tinged with skepticism and strategic calculation. In Afghanistan, post-2021 US withdrawal, India’s $27 million aid and embassy reopening in 2022 are seen as opportunistic rather than transformative, dwarfed by China’s $31 million pledge and direct Taliban engagement. The US tolerates India’s Russia ties here, viewing them as a counterweight to Beijing, but doubts New Delhi’s influence.
In Africa, India’s $12 billion credit lines since 2015 lag behind China’s $150 billion, prompting Western critiques of its shallow footprint despite summits like the 2015 India-Africa Forum. The Middle East, with the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) launched in 2023, offers promise—potentially slashing trade times by 40%—but its $20 billion scope is dwarfed by China’s BRI, and the Israel-Palestine conflict stalls progress. Western capitals see India as a useful but limited counterbalance to China, not a leader.
India’s global reach is more performative than substantive, hampered by resource constraints and a lack of strategic clarity. The West’s tepid support reflects a harsh truth: India is a pawn, not a player, in these theaters.
To become a rich nation, India must refine its maneuvers. With energy pragmatism, India can increase Russian oil imports and accelerate sustainable green energy solutions with US tech, and negotiate strategic discounts from Gulf states to offset losses. India can pursue Track II dialogues to reduce trade deficits and collaborate on climate action, while doubling border defense spending by 2030. For a regional reset, India can offer big grants to Bangladesh and Nepal, prioritizing connectivity over rivalry with China, to reclaim influence. To align the west, India can deepen quad ties in joint defense projects, balancing Russia’s role without alienating the US.
In the Global South Leadership, India can leverage G20 to secure big funds in climate finance commitments, cementing India’s role as a development advocate.
India’s dream of wealth and power hinges on shedding its timid multi-alignment for a bold, decisive stance. Without risking confrontation—with China, the US, or its own inertia—New Delhi will remain a geopolitical drifter, not a titan. The storm is here; India must grow thorns, not just roots, to thrive.
India’s geopolitical tightrope—balancing US pressure, Russian ties, and China’s rise—reveals a nation adrift, not ascendant. Its reactive policies and regional failures, from Bangladesh’s drift to a shallow African footprint, expose strategic timidity. To become a rich, influential power, India must shed indecision, bolster economic diplomacy, and assert leadership over mere multi-alignment. Without bold risks and a clear vision, New Delhi’s ambitions will falter, leaving it a bystander in a world it seeks to shape.
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Rajeev Ahmed
The Editor of Geopolits.com and the Author of the book titled Bengal Nexus
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