Right now, Bangladesh is going through a critical moment in its political journey. It’s not just a simple handover of power or a break before the next election. Instead, the country is facing much bigger and deeper questions: Who really has the right to govern? What does democracy mean in a country coming out of long-term authoritarian rule? And how should Bangladesh redefine itself in a world shaped by foreign influence, regional rivalries, and weakened national institutions?
Since Sheikh Hasina was removed in August 2024 and Dr Muhammad Yunus took over as the head of the interim government, Bangladesh has entered a time of great uncertainty—what the thinker Gramsci called an “interregnum”: the old system is gone, but a new one hasn’t fully taken shape yet. The political chaos we’re seeing is just a symptom of a much deeper breakdown in the country’s political system.
The Nature of the Interim Government: Balancing Global Support and Local Uncertainty
Dr Muhammad Yunus is a well-respected figure internationally, but opinions about him at home are deeply divided. He’s a rare type of leader in the global South—a technocrat who didn’t rise to power through elections or political party backing. Instead, he’s in this position because of his reputation, support from the international community, and connections with influential parts of civil society.
The fact that his offer to resign caused such panic among major political parties like the BNP, Jamaat, and National Citizen Party (NCP) says a lot. It doesn’t mean they fully trust him—it shows they’re afraid of what would happen if he steps down, because none of them are truly ready to take over. His role isn’t about holding power—it’s more about being a neutral figure in a political climate where everything feels like a winner-takes-all game.
But this creates a big problem: how can a government that wasn’t elected call itself a bridge to democracy, especially when it’s also limiting political expression and hasn’t shared a clear plan for moving forward? You don’t earn legitimacy just by having good intentions—it has to come from public support, transparency, and the ability to govern effectively. Right now, the interim government might look stable from the outside, but inside it’s fragile and uncertain.
Dr Yunus isn’t just leading a temporary government—he’s overseeing a bold experiment, backed by Western powers, trying to replace party-based politics with a technocratic model in a country that’s sharply divided. This isn’t just a pause before the next election. It’s a push to fundamentally change how the country is governed.
BNP’s Strategic Situation: Ready for Elections, but Facing Deeper Risks
After over ten years of being pushed out of politics, facing government crackdowns, and being shut out of elections, the BNP is now in the strongest position to take back the role of leading a democratic government. Its push for elections by December 2025 isn’t just a political move—it’s a matter of survival. The party wants to take advantage of the current power vacuum and reclaim its place in the country’s political history.
But BNP’s problems go beyond just preparing for an election. The party still hasn’t clearly explained what kind of country it wants to build after the Awami League. While its street protests have helped pressure the interim government, relying too much on these movements shows the party is still weak when it comes to having strong, stable institutions. Even if BNP wins big in the next election, that victory could be undermined by government officials, police, and security agencies who remain loyal to the old regime and could block change from within.
BNP’s biggest challenge won’t be winning the election—it’ll be holding power the day after. To succeed, the party needs to move beyond being just an opposition force. It must show that it can govern responsibly, rebuild trust in institutions, offer a plan for national healing, and act with discipline and long-term thinking.
Jamaat and NCP: Out of Step in the New Political Reality
Jamaat-e-Islami is trying to make a shiny comeback in politics by calling for trials and reforms, presenting itself as a supporter of justice during this transitional period. But its controversial past still casts a long shadow. Many in society—especially liberals and key parts of the state—are still strongly against allowing Jamaat to fully return, especially at a time when the global mood is largely against political Islam.
Jamaat seems to think that in a divided political landscape, even a small amount of influence could give it real power. But it’s misjudging the moment. This isn’t like the post-election periods of 1991 or 2001. Today, the urban middle class, civil society, and even the military are far less willing to accept Jamaat’s presence. Its relevance is quickly fading.
As for the NCP, which once seemed like a promising, elite-led alternative, it has lost both its direction and credibility. Its dramatic demands—like canceling all elections held under Sheikh Hasina—show that it’s out of touch with legal and political realities.
In truth, both Jamaat and the NCP belong to an earlier era. Their ongoing attempts to stay politically visible are more of a distraction than a real contribution. The political shift now happening in Bangladesh is not about pushing confusion—it’s about rebuilding institutions and finding a new path forward.
Institutional Breakdown and the Bureaucratic Pushback: A Crisis That’s Quietly Growing
The protests happening across key government offices—from demonstrations at the Secretariat to lockouts at the tax department—aren’t just regular unrest. They point to something much more serious: government officials, who usually stay out of politics, are now stepping in as active political players. This shows a growing divide between the interim government and the country’s permanent administrative system.
This bureaucratic pushback is happening for two main reasons:
1. The government’s proposed reforms—like changing the rules for civil service jobs, shifting tax powers to local levels, and evaluating bureaucrats based on performance—are seen as threats to their long-standing privileges.
2. Many civil servants don’t believe the interim government will last long. Their protests are really acts of self-protection before any major changes are pushed through.
What we’re seeing is a quiet rebellion from within the administration. If the government doesn’t take this seriously, it could lead to a bigger crisis: the state may become so fractured that even good policies won’t be put into action effectively.
Civil-Military Relations: The Quiet Watchdog and Unspoken Limits
The Bangladesh Army, often seen as the country’s stabilising force, has stayed publicly silent but is closely observing the situation. Since August 2024, the military has chosen not to get directly involved—but only as long as things remain under control. That control, however, is starting to weaken.
The army doesn’t back Dr Muhammad Yunus because they agree with his ideas. Instead, they see him as a useful figure. His global reputation helps the military avoid clashing with powerful Western countries. But even this quiet support has its limits. If the interim government can’t bring back order—or tries to stay in power past June 2026 without broad agreement—the military might step in. Not with a coup or tanks, but by reshaping the government behind the scenes: replacing advisers, calling early elections, or installing neutral experts to take charge.
The army isn’t looking to take power for itself. Its main concern is stopping the country from falling apart. But patience is running thin. It won’t stand by and let a short-term caretaker setup turn into a long-term regime backed by foreign interests.
Global Politics: The West’s Hope vs India’s Concerns
Western countries are strongly backing Dr Muhammad Yunus because they want to turn Bangladesh into a success story of democracy after years of authoritarian rule. The image of a Nobel Peace Prize winner cleaning up a corrupt system fits well with their ideals. That’s why they’re offering financial support, diplomatic recognition, and help with rebuilding institutions—all based on this vision.
India, on the other hand, is more cautious. It’s worried that if the BNP and Jamaat come back to power, anti-India feelings could grow again. Delhi also doesn’t fully trust the West’s push for liberal democracy right on its doorstep. It fears losing influence in the region and having its strategic interests undermined.
This difference in approach is risky. Bangladesh could turn into a battleground for quiet geopolitical rivalry:
1. If the West goes too far, it could trigger a wave of nationalism and resistance from inside the country.
2. If India reacts too strongly, it might encourage the military to step back in and take control.
So, Bangladesh’s future depends not just on what happens at home, but also on how it balances the competing pressures from the West’s democratic ideals and India’s strategic concerns.
Reform and Justice: The Three Big Challenges Facing the Interim Government
The interim government has taken on three major tasks—holding elections, carrying out reforms, and starting trials. But trying to do all this without being elected makes the job extremely difficult.
Running fair elections isn’t just about picking a date. It also means fixing the Election Commission, checking the accuracy of the voter list, and rebuilding trust with all political parties.
Reforms—especially in government and the economy—will face strong resistance from powerful groups who don’t want change, unless the government works to build agreement across the board.
As for trials, if they aren’t handled openly and fairly, people might see them as revenge rather than justice.
If the government fails in any one of these areas, it could lose credibility in all of them.
This government’s real strength isn’t in forcing change, but in bringing people together. Instead of pushing through reforms alone, it needs to work through dialogue and shared solutions. That means focusing on fair justice, not revenge—and making sure everyone feels included in shaping the future.
Bangladesh’s Moment to Choose Between Moving Forward or Falling Back
What’s happening now isn’t just a temporary problem—it’s a major turning point for the country. Bangladesh is facing two possible futures:
1. One where all sides come together for a smooth transition leading to elections in December 2025. After that, the country would focus on building stronger institutions, healing divisions, and reforming the constitution. This path would finally bring true democracy to a nation that has long swung between authoritarian rule and military-backed governments.
2. The other where the interim government stays too long, protests grow, and trust in the government breaks down. This could lead to another cycle of military-controlled democracy, reforms pushed by outside powers, and increasing dependence on foreign countries.
The decision isn’t just up to the interim government. Political parties, civil society, and ordinary people all have a role to play. For real progress, justice, genuine democracy, and national independence need to work together. Without that, hopes for change will fall apart because of their contradictions.
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Rajeev Ahmed
Editor of Geopolits.com
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