Bangladesh has shown conditional support for a United Nations plan to open a humanitarian aid corridor between Bangladesh and Myanmar’s Rakhine State. UN Secretary-General António Guterres suggested this idea during his visit to Dhaka in March 2025. He said such a corridor could help create fairer conditions for the future return of Rohingya refugees. However, Guterres warned that, because of ongoing fighting, the Rohingya cannot return to Rakhine with dignity just yet. Instead, he said delivering aid safely into Myanmar now could help prepare the ground for their return later.
The idea of a “humanitarian channel” or “secure route” has been pushed by aid groups, who see it as a lifeline for civilians trapped by war. For example, the organisation Fortify Rights has called on Bangladesh and the Arakan Army (a Rakhine ethnic armed group) to make cross-border aid and trade possible, warning that failing to act could lead to more deaths.
By early 2025, Bangladesh was hosting around 1.2 million Rohingya refugees – most of them Muslims who fled Myanmar’s brutal military operations in 2017. About 740,000 arrived in that 2017 exodus, causing camps in Cox’s Bazar to become overcrowded and heavily strain Bangladesh’s resources.
Meanwhile, the situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine State has worsened. Fighting between the Myanmar army (the junta) and the Arakan Army has displaced hundreds of thousands and blocked humanitarian access. UN experts reported that by early 2025, Rakhine was close to famine, with more than 2 million people – including Rohingya and other ethnic minorities – at risk of starving. Relief efforts have also been hit hard by funding cuts, including a one-third cut in U.S. aid.
Given this crisis, Bangladesh has been cautious and practical. It has long pushed for peace and dialogue while balancing humanitarian needs with security concerns. In late April 2025, Bangladesh’s Foreign Adviser Md. Touhid Hossain said that Bangladesh agreed “in principle” to the UN’s corridor proposal but added that certain conditions must be met. He did not list the conditions, but diplomats suggested that Bangladesh wants firm guarantees – like ceasefires, protection of minority rights, or international monitoring – to make sure Rakhine is truly safe before allowing Rohingya to return.
Bangladesh’s officials also pointed out the practical difficulties. Foreign Adviser Hossain said setting up a corridor would require careful technical coordination with UN agencies. Also, more than 80 percent of Rakhine State is now controlled by the Arakan Army, which Myanmar’s government considers an illegal group. Because of this, Bangladesh officially cannot talk directly with the Arakan Army, although it has been quietly engaging through back channels to discuss issues like creating “safe zones” for refugees.
Humanitarian Imperatives and Risks
The main reason for the proposed corridor is the desperate need for humanitarian help. The UN and aid groups have warned that people in Rakhine State are getting almost no help at all. Fortify Rights found that Myanmar’s military has blocked nearly all aid from reaching conflict areas, causing deaths that could have been avoided. They argue that setting up a cross-border route could save many lives.
UN relief workers have said again and again that increasing aid inside Myanmar is essential if there’s ever going to be a chance for Rohingya refugees to return home safely. In this situation, Bangladesh’s conditional support shows that it realises just talking diplomatically isn’t enough — real action, like setting up a corridor, could help quickly get food, medicine, and vaccines to civilians trapped by the fighting. Humanitarian corridors have saved lives before in other wars, like in Yemen and Syria, though they always depend on both sides agreeing to a ceasefire and letting the aid pass safely.
Still, there are serious risks and challenges with this idea. First, the corridor needs permission to work. As UN chief Guterres pointed out, it can only happen if both sides — the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army — agree to it. If the military refuses, or tries to heavily control it, the plan could fail before it even starts. And because the Arakan Army controls most of the area now, they would also have to at least silently accept it. But getting both sides to trust each other enough to allow this in the middle of a civil war will be extremely hard.
Second, there’s a fear that the corridor could be misused. Some experts warn that fighters or weapons could be smuggled through under the cover of humanitarian aid. Indian analysts have even suggested that if Western countries get too involved, they might secretly support the Arakan Army to weaken Myanmar’s military. Myanmar’s government is already suspicious and has accused foreigners of backing rebels. In a worst-case situation, if the corridor is abused, the fighting could get worse. To prevent this, Bangladesh would want strong monitoring, like UN or Red Cross observers and tightly sealed aid shipments — but controlling everything at a busy, conflict-affected border is very difficult.
Finally, there’s a real chance the corridor might never happen. If fighting continues or gets worse, or if no ceasefire can be agreed, Bangladesh might withdraw its support.
In that case, nothing would change: over a million Rohingya would still be stuck in crowded camps in Bangladesh, and people in Rakhine would keep suffering under blockade and famine threats. If this happens, Bangladesh might look for other options — like pushing for small “safe zones” inside Myanmar or pushing harder for stronger UN action. Inside Bangladesh, delays and uncertainty about the corridor could stretch the country’s already thin resources even further, since the refugee camps depend heavily on aid money, which is running low.
What Could Happen Next
To think about where things might be heading, we can imagine a few possible futures. These aren’t predictions, just organised guesses about how events could play out:
Scenario 1: A Successful Humanitarian Corridor
In this best-case scenario, Bangladesh, Myanmar (either officially or through local groups), and international aid organisations work together to set up a limited aid route.
Maybe they agree on temporary ceasefires to make a safe path, and the UN or another trusted group escorts the aid deliveries. Through this corridor, food, medicine, and other supplies would reach the people suffering in northern Rakhine State, helping prevent famine. Over time, the corridor might grow to include small trade activities too, as some groups like Fortify Rights have suggested. If the security situation improves, it might even open the door for some Rohingya refugees to start going home under supervision. If this goes smoothly, it would improve life for civilians, build trust between sides, and maybe even help encourage a wider ceasefire or political talks. Plus, countries that are tired of funding the Rohingya refugee camps might be more willing to provide money again if they see real progress happening through this corridor.
Scenario 2: Corridor Leads to More Conflict
In this much riskier situation, trying to open the corridor backfires. Myanmar’s military might see any aid deliveries from Bangladesh as a threat and could respond violently. Or insurgent groups could misuse the corridor to sneak supplies or people across the border. Even if Bangladesh and the UN only want to send aid, Myanmar’s government could accuse them of secretly helping the rebels — something that some news outlets have already suggested could happen. If weapons or fighters do use the corridor, Myanmar’s military could launch new attacks in Rakhine or even along the Bangladesh border. Bangladesh would then likely shut down the project to protect its own security. This could even pull India into the mix, because India supports Myanmar’s military and might see any chaos near its borders as a problem too. Instead of helping people, the corridor would become a new battleground, making life even worse for civilians.
Scenario 3: Corridor Never Happens
In this scenario, Bangladesh decides it’s just too risky to move forward. Maybe Myanmar’s military sets impossible conditions, or the Arakan Army becomes too unpredictable. If so, the idea of a corridor would be dropped. Bangladesh would be stuck hosting over a million Rohingya refugees in crowded camps, and aid groups would have to keep using risky, unofficial ways to get help into Myanmar. Frustration from the international community would grow, and Bangladesh might try other approaches, like pushing for a UN-protected “safe zone” inside Myanmar or asking other countries to take in some refugees. Inside Bangladesh, the pressure would also build — especially if international funding for the camps keeps dropping, leading to food shortages and rising tensions among refugees. If the corridor fails, Bangladesh will have no choice but to keep managing a very heavy humanitarian burden while people in Rakhine State continue to suffer.
Geopolitical and Strategic Forecast
The idea of setting up a humanitarian corridor isn’t happening in isolation — it’s tied to wider regional and global politics.
India’s Role: India, which shares borders with both Bangladesh and Myanmar, has its own stakes in Rakhine State. For example, it’s investing in a major transport project (the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project) that connects Sittwe Port to India’s northeast. Indian experts are already warning that if the corridor ends up helping the Arakan Army (which fights Myanmar’s military), it could upset India’s security plans. Because of this, Bangladesh will probably keep India updated and make it very clear that the corridor is meant only for humanitarian aid — not to get involved in Myanmar’s conflicts.
Global Powers Watching: The corridor idea sits right in the middle of bigger rivalries between powerful countries. The United States and European countries are strongly in favour of getting more aid into Myanmar — they even led the latest UN fundraising campaigns to help Rohingya refugees. China, on the other hand, is friendly with Myanmar’s military rulers and would probably not support anything that might make rebel groups stronger. Bangladesh will have to balance all these pressures carefully. It will try to stick close to international rules, working with the UN and ASEAN, while still staying neutral and not taking sides in Myanmar’s internal wars.
Inside Bangladesh: At home, Bangladesh’s interim government (which took over in late 2024) has made it clear that it will stick to the same Rohingya policy: keep sheltering refugees, but push the world to share more of the burden. Domestic politics — like the next elections or changes in leadership — might influence how bold Bangladesh can be in regional matters. However, no matter who’s in charge, there’s broad agreement among Bangladeshis that the country must continue to support the Rohingya repatriation cause.
Humanitarian Outlook
If no corridor is set up and no peace deal is reached, life in the refugee camps will stay tough — and might even get worse. The UN has already warned that in 2025, food rations for Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar could be slashed by more than half because donations are drying up. This could lead to widespread malnutrition and even unrest in the camps. On top of that, every monsoon season brings deadly risks like cholera outbreaks and flooding. In other words, just keeping things the way they are (“business as usual”) carries big dangers too.
If a corridor does get up and running, though, it could help share the humanitarian responsibility more fairly — some aid would go directly into Rakhine, easing the pressure on Bangladesh a little. Still, even if aid gets moving, most experts agree that a full solution — like sending the Rohingya safely back to Myanmar — is years away. That would need much bigger changes inside Myanmar, like guaranteeing citizenship rights and bringing those responsible for past violence to justice — and those changes are nowhere close yet.
Strategic Risk Matrix for Bangladesh — Humanitarian Corridor Scenarios
Final Strategic Advice for Bangladesh
1. Keep humanitarian corridor negotiations open — but prepare fallback options immediately.
2. Insist on full UN/Red Cross monitoring to prevent corridor abuse.
3. Privately reassure China and India that Dhaka remains neutral.
4. Invest in camp resilience (e.g., water management, disease control) ahead of 2025 monsoon season.
5. Lobby globally for flexible humanitarian funding linked to corridor success/failure milestones.
Bangladesh’s Move on the Humanitarian Corridor
Bangladesh’s cautious approval of the UN’s idea for a humanitarian corridor shows it’s trying to walk a fine line — recognising that there’s a major humanitarian crisis while also making sure its own national interests are protected. By agreeing “in principle” — but adding conditions — Dhaka has shown it’s willing to cooperate with international efforts, but it has also made it clear it wants full control over when, where, and how the corridor would actually function.
At the end of the day, whether the corridor succeeds won’t depend on official statements — it will come down to what happens on the ground. It will need the cooperation of Myanmar’s warring groups, regional countries like India and China, and humanitarian agencies — all working together despite the chaos.
If the corridor can be safely set up, it could help reduce suffering and build some trust among all sides. But if it’s misused — for example, if rebels use it for their advantage — it could make the situation worse, increasing tensions and dragging out the Rohingya crisis even longer. What’s clear is that Bangladesh, which has been hosting Rohingya refugees for years at great cost, sees the corridor as a possible “win-win” — but only if it is properly controlled and kept purely for humanitarian aid.
No matter what happens next, the discussion around the corridor has already had one big impact: it has put a fresh spotlight on the suffering of civilians in Rakhine and made it obvious that the world urgently needs to find new, creative ways to deal with this long-running crisis.
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Geopolits Research Desk
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