Two years after the Galwan clash in the Ladakh highlands, which claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and sunk India-China relations to their lowest point in decades, the two countries are normalizing relations in many ways, with the Indian side demonstrating pragmatism far ahead of the “lal aankh” rhetoric. Security issues and opposing alliances have strained relations between China and India in recent years. However, with the surprise arrival of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India on March 25, the China–India relationship seemed to have taken a huge step forward. Subsequent Ukrainian conflict and global economic downturn is pushing India and China towards closer cooperation.
China and India collaborated on the crucial topics of coal reduction and climate justice during the recent COP26 climate conference in Glasgow. Due to their separate and historic relationships with Russia — a formal cooperation in the case of China and military dependence and China-focused concern in the case of India — China and India both abstained at the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly on the current Ukraine conflict. Yet, these two behemoths are engaged in intense rivalry in South Asia.
The spread of Chinese influence has been India’s main concern on its South Asian periphery since the Modi-led government took power. China’s success in gaining the trust of India’s smaller neighbors was facilitated in large part by India’s overbearing attitude toward its neighbors’ issues.
The people of those smaller countries were deeply resentful of India’s dominant posture and oppressive techniques. Meanwhile, India’s divided atmosphere exacerbated fears among its neighbors, forcing them to embrace China.
As part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China, with its enormous financial weight, began pouring billions of dollars into infrastructure projects in those countries. To deal with the crisis, India has resorted to extending aid packages for infrastructure development to its neighbors. India’s assistance effort, on the other hand, was overshadowed by Chinese contributions due to the country’s massive current-account deficit.
In May 2020, China and India engaged in border skirmishes near the Line of Actual Control over minor road developments, and Indian public opinion has been enraged since. The conflict has had a significant impact. Indeed, India retaliated by blocking 59 Chinese mobile phone apps (increasing the total to 220 this year) and solidifying ties with Quad partners.
Considering the economic constraints, India, despite mounting Western sanctions over Russia due to the Ukrainian, has increased energy purchases from Russia, including oil and coal. It is evident that, despite Western concerns, India is unlikely to step back from its ties with Russia. Likewise, China, the second largest economy of the world, is gearing up to take its ties with Russia to the next level.
Russia is not the only node that connects India and China in geopolitics. The place of intense competition to gain regional supremacy in Bangladesh offers an interesting window for China-India cooperation.
India’s political and cultural entanglements with Bangladesh are extensive. In every aspect of Bangladeshi life, Indian perspectives on Bangladesh are a source of heated controversy. Bangladesh has a significant following for Indian entertainment, and India’s bordering provinces speak languages that are similar to Bangladesh’s. Despite the fact that the countries were divided in 1947 and given distinct maps, many citizens on both sides of the border have family residing on the other side.
The current Dhaka government, which took office in 2008, is widely seen as pro-Indian, having gone to great pains to address major Indian concerns about security and connectivity to the country’s northeastern states. New Delhi’s cautious approach to Dhaka’s worries, on the other hand, allowed China to pitch itself as a valuable strategic partner. Bangladesh’s ambition to join the BRI has allowed China to participate in the development of key infrastructure projects in the country.
However, the India factor in Bangladeshi politics is far larger, and it is frequently a source of heated dispute in Bangladeshi media. Bangladesh is a critical component in the dynamics of Indian security, according to India. Bangladesh, in particular, is a major transportation corridor connecting India’s northeastern regions and is seen as a viable alternative to the endangered Siliguri Corridor.
Although China’s cultural affinities with Bangladesh are not as strong as those with India, Bangladesh’s growing economy provides opportunities for investment and mutual prosperity.
Beijing’s relationships with Dhaka have grown by leaps and bounds since diplomatic relations were established in 1975. In the field of defense, they have a strong partnership, with China being Bangladesh’s primary supplier of military gear.
China is constructing infrastructural projects in Bangladesh worth $10 billion, including a 3 square kilometer industrial park. Because of rising expenses at home, China is trying to relocate some of its businesses to Bangladesh, and this trend will accelerate due to US tariffs on Chinese exports.
India has so far refused to join the BRI, citing concerns about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which New Delhi claims violates Indian sovereignty because it passes through the disputed province of Kashmir. But complicated geopolitical developments are making New Delhi think about new options.
The Bangladeshi port of Chittagong is now enabling access to India’s northeastern territories, which will assist promote regional trade by complementing the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor with the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) corridor.
The potential for a start of India-China regional cooperation centered on Bangladesh, where a key Bangladeshi port will serve as the connecting hub, is demonstrated by India’s desire to allow “limited Chinese investment” for boosting connectivity and trade in the northeast using the BBIN sub-regional hub. In addition, having a government in Dhaka that is eager to accommodate both Asian behemoths in its policies will aid China and India’s tighter relationship.
China’s multifaceted participation in Bangladesh is now a simple reality, and any attempt by India to challenge it will be ineffective. In Bangladesh, meaningful engagement with China will be critical for India’s security and regional stability in the northeastern states. Despite Western criticism of Bangladesh’s 2018 elections, China and India backed the current Dhaka administration.
With Bangladesh’s major opposition parties becoming increasingly pro-Western, the current administration in Dhaka, which maintains close connections with both Beijing and New Delhi, can serve as a springboard for regional collaboration between India and China. China and India will therefore have the opportunity to work together in Bangladesh to explore mutual interests, clamp down on components of hybrid warfare in the region that represent a threat to regional stability, and encourage regional growth through connectivity in order to strengthen their relations.